This essay argues that common metaphors and metaphoric phrases used in biopolitical discourse limit how meanings are constructed by framing messages narrowly: so much so, that alternate readings are delimited, resulting in less opportunity for cognitive scrutiny of such messages. We moor our discussion of metaphors in cognitive linguistics, building on three decades of research by scholars including Sam Glucksberg (2008), George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980, 1999) , and Ray Gibbs, Jr. (2006, 2008), demonstrating how research in framing effects bolsters our claims of limited entailments resulting from message construction. By situating our discussion of framing in biopolitics we make a case that metaphors including Frankenfood, designer baby, vegetative state and death tax address how life and death are -managed‖ in discourse (Foucault 1980) . In this essay we demonstrate ways in which the framing of some metaphors in social discourse slip under readers' and viewers' cognitive radars, and thus become -under-the-radar metaphors.‖
Examining metaphors in biopolitical discourse
In this essay we argue that some metaphors and metaphoric phrasings have become interwoven with message construction in everyday discourse-so much so that counter-arguments are either neglected wholesale or greatly diminished. For example, -designer baby‖ has become the common parlance in designating an embryo created outside the womb, but no alternate metaphor has taken hold with the same degree of salience in popular discourse.
While our focus is centered on the framing of metaphors in discourse, we also argue that some message constructions carry with them presumptions about their interpretation by audience members, thus invoking preferred readings and limiting the availability of possible responses. Indeed, some scholars argue that metaphors can -guide and direct thought in a comprehensive manner‖ (Condit & Condit 2001: 37) , drive cognition (Price, Tewksbury & Powers 1997) , impart emotions (Slovic 2007) , impact judgments (Tversky & Kahneman 1981) , influence public opinion (Benoit 2001) and shape government policy (Kruglanski, Crenshaw, Post & Victoroff 2008) .
We assert that when metaphors become linked inextricably to constructed messages in discourse-what we call message frames-the availability of polysemantic audience responses are narrowed. And while we have not embarked on an empirical study of audience responses, we assert that, when message frames are narrow, audiences are more likely to embrace the semantic package with little cognitive scrutiny. Our essay is both a descriptive and interpretive examination of metaphors that leads to an evaluation and critique of how and why such metaphors retain their persuasive efficacy.
We situate our discussion of the political aspect of framing in biopolitics, borrowing from Michel Foucault, who viewed biopolitics as a struggle over truth claims about issues that impact the construct life. In writing about genetically modified foods, Peter Andrée made a compelling case for discussing metaphors in biopolitics, which he described as -modern relations of power, rooted in specific expert truth-claims and material practices, that enable the regulation and efficient production of ‗life' by scientists, governments and industries, as well as the forms of resistance that emerge in this context‖ (2002: 164) . We anchor our discussion of metaphors in cognitive linguistics, building on three decades of research by scholars including Sam Glucksberg (2008) , George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980, 1999) , and Ray Gibbs, Jr. (2006 . Biopolitics allows us to address the political dimensions of how scientific information is communicated and how life is managed. We turn to discourse as the scaffold that supports our examination of metaphors in biopolitics. For Foucault, discourse served as a mechanism where truth claims are produced, reproduced and challenged. We argue that issues that Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 7.1 (2011 ): 29-59 DOI: 10.2478 engage biopolitics are fraught with claims of truth, objectivity and morality, and that such claims influence individual judgments, public opinion and policy. Truth, Foucault asserted, is spun through discourse, and any examination of discourse requires deconstructing the tactics and techniques used to bolster truth claims. We argue that metaphors have become effective tactics through which truth claims unfold. Cognitive linguistics provides an empirical, evidence-based foundation for our discussion of metaphors and metaphor interpretation. From the perspective of biopolitics-a particularly salient avenue to discuss metaphors and frames-we have selected four issues that promote both figurative and literal interpretations (resulting in entailments) of metaphors: Frankenfood, designer babies, vegetative state and death tax. We examine the literature that explicates figurative and literal entailments in metaphors, drawing linkages with message and cognitive framing in the mass communication arena. We then demonstrate through the four exemplars how meanings are created in discourse about biopolitics, attending to mass media coverage in the United States of genetically modified foods and embryos, the Theresa Schiavo lawsuit and news coverage, and the inheritance tax. The four issues constitute a case study of metaphoric language that we explore both figuratively and literally.
We ground our argument in a cognitive and constructionist vein, building on empirical research on metaphor comprehension (for reviews see Glucksberg 2008; Gibbs 2006 Gibbs , 2008 and borrowing from the framing insights of William Gamson and his colleagues within the context of Foucauldian discourse processes in biopolitics. And because the available research does not support definitive claims about causal effects on audiences, we instead buttress our claims by examining public opinion surrounding the four exemplars, offering an exogenous avenue to help illuminate the mapping of metaphoric message framing to audience framing, as recommended by Yin (2003) . That is, focusing on text alone limits conjectures about media effects, while public opinion polls offer a glimpse into possible linkages (Benoit 2001; Stromer-Galley & Schiappa 1989; Yin 2003) .
Figurative and literal metaphors
We begin with an examination of a type of ambiguous metaphor where the relationship between figurative and literal interpretations is entwined (Cameron 2007) . What defines this type of metaphor is the presentation of a metaphorical phrase as if it were a literal description of the topic. An example from Lynne Cameron's study of reconciliation talks between Jo Berry, daughter of a British MP killed by an IRA-planted bomb, and Pat Magee, the former IRA operative who planted the bomb. Berry described her journey of understanding and healing in terms that can be understood as simultaneously referring to her literal travels 32 Cynthia-Lou Coleman & L. David Ritchie Examining Metaphors in Biopolitical Discourse through England and Ireland and to her mental and emotional processes; in other passages Pat refers to coming face-to-face with the effects of his actions in terms that simultaneously refer to confronting Jo personally and to his own mental acts of understanding.
An example more relevant to the present discussion is the phrase death tax, which is both figurative and literal. Death tax carries just enough literal meaning to seem literal: the tax is paid after the death of a benefactor, although it is paid not by the benefactor but by the heirs. The phrase seems to suggest that an individual is taxed at death, hence, death tax. This metaphor is related to pass away, which is usually regarded as a euphemism for dying, but for those who believe in an immaterial spirit separate from the body, and identify the person with that spirit, pass away literally describes what happens at death when the spirit passes away from the body. Thus, if the person is identified with the spirit that has passed away from the body but is still alive, it might seem reasonable to claim that the spirit of the deceased person still has an ownership claim over the estate until after the estate taxes have been paid, and thus the tax is levied against the spirit / person, and not against the heirs to the estate. [This ambiguity was exploited in pop culture in the Beatles' song, Taxman (Harrison 1966) , -And my advice to those who die / declare the pennies on your eyes.‖)]
We argue that the framing of death tax illustrates what Foucault considered a tactic deployed in biopolitical debates, where a phrase is designed to distract attention from its metaphorical nature and focus attention instead on the literal implications. Often, as in the case death tax, the metaphor serves explicitly persuasive ends. Metaphors of this type are frequently presented by persuasion professionals as literal descriptions of a topic: if the literal metaphor deployed is successful, the schemas and simulations activated by the literal expression will be applied, without critical examination to the topic. Because the effect is to slip by unexamined assumptions without detection, we refer to these as -under-the-radar‖ metaphors.
The literal power of metaphors has been examined empirically only recently, and thus the theoretical discussion of metaphorical language has shifted from a descriptive view in which metaphors and other tropes are regarded as mere semantic substitutions to a more cognitive view in which metaphors are regarded as surface manifestations of underlying thought processes (Gibbs 1994 (Gibbs , 2008 Lakoff & Johnson 1980 , 1999 . In other words, metaphors are usually more than just a figure of speech or -deft trick of rhetoric‖ (Danforth 2007) , and they have very real effects on cognition and behavior, even when they are not recognized as metaphorical (Gibbs 2006 (Gibbs , 2008 argument as a war and anger as heat and pressure. 1 Lakoff and Johnson noted that a metaphor consists of a source domain and a topic domain: we understand one thing (an argument) in terms of another (a war). The metaphor vehicle is often incongruent with the topic, so that it can only be understood figuratively-an attorney is not literally a shark and my boss is not truly a block of ice. However, many other common metaphorical expressions are ambiguous in the sense that they could be either figurative or literal. A designer baby might refer to an infant decked out in Prada duds, in which case the phrase is metonymic. Design literally refers to a process of selecting features during the process of creating an object, usually a consumer product. Extending this meaning, in everyday speech, designer as a prefix refers to a consumer product that has been designed to satisfy consumers' sense of taste and fashion. Thus, -designer baby‖ would literally imply a baby with features selected or even created by the designer to suit parents' fashion tastes-perhaps with brilliant green eyes, precocious language abilities or curly hair. When United Press International ran a news item in February, 2011, titled, -First French designer baby born,‖ the story stated that the embryo was created in vitro (outside the womb) and -selected‖ for its ability to provide stem cell transplants for the baby's older brother, who is stricken with an incurable disease. Selecting one embryo from among several is not quite the same as designing an embryo, but it is different from the -natural‖ way embryos come into existence in a way that the use of -designer baby‖ highlights. Designer baby is literal in the sense that the embryo was chosen by design because of its DNA but it is figurative in the sense that the embryo's DNA resulted, not from a design process, but in the course of laboratory fertilization. (To create a genuinely designer baby the doctor would select genes associated with the desired traits and splice them into the embryo's DNA.)
In some cases, the context rules out alternative meanings: -hand him a hot potato‖ can be interpreted literally if spoken in the kitchen. The telephone excuse -he's tied up right now and can't come to the phone‖ might be figuratively true, but is only literally true in a fanciful scenario involving a burglary or slightly unusual sexual behavior.
In yet another class of ambiguous metaphors, it may be possible for both a literal and a figurative interpretation to be simultaneously meaningful. A marriage does not move through space, and hence cannot -reach a dead-end,‖ but a honeymoon trip does proceed through space, and could conceivably reach a deadend. Whether the relationship itself would simultaneously -reach a dead-end‖ is another matter. Given the elevated body temperature that often accompanies sexual passion, a love affair can at times be both literally and figuratively -hot‖ and social More recently Gibbs (2006) has shown that metaphors are often understood by experiencing a schema-generated simulation of the state, object or action described by the vehicle. Barsalou's (2007) perceptual simulation theory of cognition provides a basis to generalize Gibbs's approach, suggesting that metaphors may activate only a partial and limited simulation of perceptual experience (including simulations of emotions and thoughts) associated with the vehicle.
Metaphors and perceptual simulation
Gibbs proposed an extension of conceptual metaphor theory based on evidence that metaphors activate schemas associated with the metaphor vehicle, leading listeners to experience simulations of the perceptual experience. Gibbs cited extensive experimental results confirming, for example, that phrases such as -blew his stack‖ or -a heated argument,‖ in which anger and other strong emotions are expressed in terms of physical heat and pressurized fluid or gas, activate schemas related to -PRESSURIZED FLUID IN A CONTAINER.‖ Similarly, Zhong and Leonardelli (2008) reported that an induced experience of social rejection (i.e., -a chilly reception‖) increases the probability that a research participant will judge the physical temperature of the laboratory as uncomfortably cold, supporting the idea that the emotional and sensory experiences are connected at a fundamental level.
Barsalou's (2007) Language and Situated Simulation (LASS) theory extends and provides a more general theoretical basis for Gibbs' model. Barsalou acknowledged that language is sometimes processed in terms of connections to other words and phrases, but claimed that deeper processing (and more complex reasoning) is accomplished by activating partial or complete simulations of perceptions that are associated with the word or phrase. These simulated perceptions include proprioceptive and introspective awareness of the body's internal state and thought processes as well as exteroceptive perceptions of the external environment. Thus, -blew his stack‖ or -a chilly reception‖ might activate complete -hot fluid in a container‖ or -immersion in cold water‖ schema, or might lead the hearer to experience simulations of only one or two related perceptions, perhaps a loud noise and the emotion of anger in the first instance, and a sensation of cold and the emotion of rejection in the second instance. In a situation of low listener involvement, these phrases might activate only a connection to one or two related words (e.g., anger and not welcome, respectively).
Another example might be -puppy love‖ in which the interpretation could include warm and tender feelings interlaced with thoughts of puppies, children or one's first heart-throb. Suppression of the primary or literal meanings leaves the Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 7.1 (2011): 29-59 DOI: 10.2478/v10016-011-0003-8 secondary schemas and associated simulations in a state of heightened activation (Gernsbacher, Keysar, Robertson & Werner 2001; Kintsch 1998) . Thus the context-relevant nuances of perception, feeling and thought associated with the metaphor vehicle are linked to the topic of the metaphor and constitute the meaning of the metaphor in that context. The simulation approach does not necessarily require that the primary meaning of a metaphor vehicle be activated, or indeed that there even be an interpretable primary meaning. Thus phrases such as -attack a position,‖ -defend a position‖ and -win an argument,‖ which Lakoff and Johnson (1980) associated with the conceptual metaphor, -ARGUMENT IS WAR,‖ may activate a detailed war schema, or may activate only a handful of perceptual simulations that are associated with these words in various contexts including sports and games as well as combat. -Attack‖ may activate simulations of vigorous activity and opposition, with or without actual hostility. As in the case of -empty metaphors‖ (Ritchie & Dyhouse 2008) , merely the nuances of perception, thought and emotion activated by the word or phrase itself often suffice to provide -meaning‖ of the expression.
The literature therefore supports the notion of a certain elasticity surrounding metaphoric constructions and their entailments: the metaphoric structure might be shallow or deep, and cut a narrow or wide berth, while its impacts may be shortterm or long-term, slim in scope, or rich in response. We argue that metaphorical elasticity can erode in discourse, limiting its deployment. Moreover, in certain contexts, entailments may diminish, and the range of complex thoughts typically associated with metaphors also diminishes.
With this in mind, a metaphor that resonates yet offers fewer entailments is likely to have greater persuasive potential. In short, some metaphors are able to slip under the consumer's critical-cognitive radar and activate perceptual simulators associated with literal interpretations of phrases, such as death tax. We argue that the context of news discourse has the added effect of limiting critical interpretation of a phrase's meaning by casting the range of meaning within the more narrow bounds of journalistic practices. News discourse, while putatively empowered with enlarging the parameters for debate, can delimit interpretations, much in the same way that advertising delimits discourse by abbreviating and truncating meaning systems and excluding alternate renditions (Goldman & Montagne 1986 ).
Journalism, framing and metaphors
As noted above, context can influence how metaphors are deployed and interpreted. We argue that the context of everyday discourse, particularly mass mediated discourse, influences message construction and reception, both intentionally and unintentionally. For example, coining the phrase terminator seeds as referring to those that have been genetically modified to induce sterility in the subsequent generation of offspring has helped generate hostility toward such plant technology. Use of the metaphor terminator seeds abounds in news coverage beginning in 1998, helping set the frames for debate of genetically modified seeds. The journalistic practice of providing readers with two dimensions of an issue-the balance imperative-limits the parameters of discourse to a dialectic of coverage, thus narrowing the scope of polysemantic interpretations of problems (Coleman, Hartley & Kennamer 2006) . In the case of terminator seeds, even proponents of genetically modified foods invoked the same trenchant metaphor. In writing for New Scientist, Michael LePage noted that -terminator technology…sound[s] like the work of a James Bond villain intent on world domination. For critics of multinational biotech corporations, the reality seems hardly less horrifying‖ (LePage 2005, n.p.). Counter-arguments embraced the prevailing metaphoric jargon, forcing the debate of genetically modified seeds within the framework of the terminator narrative.
Mass media scholars have argued that metaphors, phrases, tropes, jingles, icons and even people (Joe the Plumber in the 2008 United States presidential race) contribute to constructing a cultural and political landscape against which biopolitical issues unfold. Some writers contend that persistent patterns emerge from constructed frames, and those that pack the greatest persuasive punch are those that resonate culturally. Such -cultural packages‖ are both a creation and a reflection of well-worn values (some even contradictory) such as Pandora's Box, the Cinderella fairytale, Devil's Bargain and David bests Goliath. For example, in their often-cited study of news coverage of nuclear power, Gamson and Modigliani (1989) observed that the -technology-as-progress frame‖ was infused in North Americans' cultural ways-of-knowing, and its appearance in mediated discourse about nuclear power mirrored this perspective.
A more recent example is an analysis of -pigeons as rats,‖ where Jerolmack argued that news discourse was imbued heavily with cultural frames, depicting pigeons as scavengers and villains, shedding -light on a cultural logic at work in discourse‖ (2008: 87) . Equating pigeons as unwanted vermin therefore illuminated cultural narratives invoking homeless deviants, bums and squatters that invaded human space. Moreover, such metaphoric packages are embedded with the solutions to their problems: birds depicted as -rats with wings‖ require a rodent exterminator. Similarly, metaphors that describe health epidemics as wars invite solutions in battle terms (e.g., capturing the virus and defeating the enemy). Gozzi argued that framing society as a machine signals that we need trained engineers to run it (1999).
Deep metaphors, like society as machine, structure discourses to such an extent that competing meanings may lie dormant, both in discourse and audience reception. Such metaphors effectively sweep aside alternative readings, and Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 7.1 (2011): 29-59 DOI: 10.2478/v10016-011-0003-8 researchers suggest that when metaphors are used over and over in common discourse, they lose their elasticity and become clichés (Hellsten 2003) . We argue they slip past audience members' cognitive scrutiny.
Metaphors' effects
In writing about science communication, Nelkin (1987) observed that metaphors -cluster and reinforce one another, creating consistent, coherent and therefore more powerful images that have strategic policy implications‖ (ibid.: 81). Metaphors not only allow journalists the tools to explain science more simply, but they also affect the way we perceive. Benoit took Nelkin's assumptions a step farther, borrowing from Schön's ruminations that metaphors establish the frameworks for solving problems that influence policy (2001: 70) . In his examination of political frames used in the 1996 US Presidential race, Benoit showed how the Robert Dole and William Clinton campaigns each used the metaphor of a bridge to illustrate their rhetoric. Dole expressed the view that traditional values endure, and offered to -be a bridge to a time of tranquility, faith, and confidence in action‖ (ibid.: 73). In contrast, Clinton invoked the bridge metaphor as a link to the future: -I want to build a bridge to the twenty-first century‖ (ibid.: 75). Benoit noted that the effectiveness of the bridge metaphor was recorded empirically in a national poll where the most common phrase remembered by respondents was the bridge to the twenty-first century and another poll in which a majority of respondents correctly linked Clinton with the phrase -a bridge to the future‖ (ibid.: 80). Benoit asserted that Clinton's framing of the bridge metaphor during the campaign widened his lead, thus influencing policy (ibid.: 79-81).
Others have tested the effects of message framing on audience cognitions and beliefs: Tversky and Kahneman's ground-breaking work in how positive and negative message frames affect readers' choices demonstrated that framing human lives as -saved‖ proved more salient than avoiding lives -lost.‖ Their work reinforced the assumption that readers and viewers resort to mental shortcuts, -generally evaluating acts in terms of a minimal account‖ (1981: 458) .
Communication researchers have demonstrated linkages between message frames and audience frames (cognitions), most notably in a 1997 study by Price, Tewksbury and Powers that linked message frames to readers' frames. Price and colleagues found compelling evidence that the ways in which news stories were framed were mapped by readers, who recounted stories with similar frames. In 1999, Valkenburg, Semetko and De Vreese extended the mapping work, again demonstrating that readers resorted to the same frames that dominated news Examining Metaphors in Biopolitical Discourse stories, thus providing empirical evidence that audience frames are influenced by message frames.
In summary, message frames, including those interwoven with metaphoric descriptions, can be effective in setting the terms of debate, defining problems and their solutions, and creating audience and policy agendas (Nelkin 1987; Tammpuu 2004; Tankard 2001) . Moreover, metaphors reflect cultural narratives and tropes, ranging from Devil's Bargain to rats-with-wings, that tacitly influence their meaning construction and adoption. Some message packages influence cognitions, ranging from audience preferences for positively worded frames, to audiences recognizing the same attributions of blame as those expressed in message frames.
We do not mean to suggest that audiences are passive or stupid. Indeed, we embrace the constructionist lens of Neuman, Just and Crigler (1992) who argued that constructionism -focuses on the subtle interaction between what the mass media convey and how people come to understand their world‖ (ibid.: xv). Moreover, audiences approach information with their own sets of lenses, and alternative readings of issues are bound to ensue. Some discourses are like a metaphorical palimpsest, wherein a text possesses more than one script. And like Foucault, we acknowledge that many social problems are a patchwork of hegemonic and resistant views.
We do argue, however, that some issues in the biopolitical realm are framed so narrowly that both discourse and interpretations are truncated. Goldman and Montagne said the narrowed realm encourages -preferred readings‖ based on an overdetermination of the message by -delimiting the range of possible interpretive moves‖ (p. 1047). That is, some messages limit their interpretation by excluding -alternative accounts‖ (p. 1078).
Under-the-radar metaphors in biopolitical discourse
In this section, we offer examples of under-the-radar metaphors from biopolitical controversies that have engaged metaphorical message constructions. Recall that by biopolitics we refer to Foucault's explication of -truth claims‖ in discourse about the regulation of -life,‖ with the implication that living things can be -managed.‖ From the policy perspective, Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson argued that biopolitics draw from issues including -genetic engineering, treatment of the terminally ill, environmental pollution, radiation levels and birth control‖ (1987: 108) . Marcy Darnvosky, a bioethicist who writes about ethics and feminist approaches to biopolitics, added to the list: -cloning for research and reproduction, sex selection and ‗designer babies'; race-specific drugs; ‗personalized genomics'; and markets in kidneys, eggs, and wombs‖ (2009: 38). We therefore selected four topics for our essay to illuminate discourse concerning genetic engineering, Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 7.1 (2011): 29-59 DOI: 10.2478/v10016-011-0003-8
reproduction, management of life and death, and the political ramifications of death: Frankenfood, designer babies, vegetative state and the death tax. We will demonstrate how metaphors invoked by such issues construct narrow frames in the context of news and other forms of popular discourse. We suggest that such metaphors may limit complex interpretations on the part of readers and viewers. Frankenfood. Scientists introduced consumers to genetically modified foods in the 1990s with the Flavr Savr™ tomato which engendered much discussion in lay and scientific circles. Disparagers associated genetically altered products with Frankenstein's monster, and the term "Frankenfood" entered public discourse. 2 We argue Frankenfood serves as an apt illustration of an under-the-radar metaphor in that the thoughts and emotions evoked by the monster-out-of-control and irresponsible scientist scripts allow encoded meanings to confront the reader and viewer head-on. We also argue that such tropes are stripped of counter-meanings by their very nature, thus leaving little opportunity for cognitive processing. Hellsten (2003) concluded that the Frankenfood metaphor is -emotionally appealing‖ and evokes -fear and anxiety.‖ The association of Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley's gothic creature with science has permeated discourse since the publication of Frankenstein in 1823, and the linking of Frankenfood with genetically modified organisms (GMOs) is inextricable. Political columnist William Safire called it a -frightening metaphor‖ that has spawned such terms as -Frankenscience,‖ -Frankenfruit‖ and -Frankenpigs‖ (Safire 2000) .
However, the "Franken-" trope also introduces an element of playfulness that works against the frightening implications. The reference to Frankenstein may also activate -monster movie‖ schemas from popular culture, and is likely to activate memories of other uses of this monster as a metaphor for scientific irresponsibility, but the word-play is also likely to activate entertaining, if somewhat horrifying, images of monstrous fruits, vegetables and farm animals, which combine ironic word-play with shock value, as when the punk rock group Dead Kennedys titled a controversial album Frankenchrist (Alternative Tentacles 1985) . This combination of playfulness, shock value and horror can have the effect of side-tracking readers from critical thought.
We found plentiful examples of the Frankenstein monster in public discourse over genetically engineered foods, beginning with the Flavr Savr tomato. In a guest editorial for the Ohio Plain Dealer in 1994, Jeffrey S. Riegel praised the tomato but acknowledged that public response could -open the floodgates to a host of new products‖ or -chill the market to any other genetically engineered foods,‖ noting that the -hopes of an entire industry rest upon the humble shoulders of a tomato‖ Garcia's metaphors included references to the companies as -biochemical giants‖ spending millions to -stomp out‖ such referendums. Garcia also invoked war metaphors, noting that the -giants‖ were -battling skirmishes on fronts from Oregon to France.‖ Garcia's profligate use of metaphors and puns helps frame his article─and the debate─in a more playful and less serious tone that distracts readers' attention and discourages critical thought even as it subtly links the monster schema with its entailments of danger and powerful to GMO foods and the -giant‖ corporations that create and market them.
Broadcasters have also helped set the media agenda for the discussion of GMO foods, with Mark Bittman, Oprah Winfrey and Mehmet Oz weighing in on the debate, encouraging viewers to attend to, for example, labeling of foods. One post on Winfrey's blog read: -I personally do not wish to eat any GMO foods‖ and -I feel that they are dangerous and that it is unfair that they are not clearly marked as GMO on the label‖ (-GMO Foods,‖ 2010 February 8).
Recently, news of the creation of a hardier version of the Atlantic salmon quickly drew the sobriquet of -Frankenfish.‖ An Associated Press story asked: -Super Salmon or Frankenfish?‖ (Jalonick 2010) , posing the -issue‖ as a choice between the pop culture hero, Superman, and the pop culture villain, Frankenstein, while a wire story from the McClatchy news service reported on legislators' efforts to halt FDA approval of the Frankenfish and stop the arrival of -alien fish out to infect our stocks‖ (Hotakainen 2011) . Cartoonist Steve Greenberg penned a comic strip showing a fish with Frankenstein's head, strapped to a lab table flanked by a white-coated scientist and his assistant who asks, -It's alive master! But is it safe for people to eat?‖ The scientist replies: -Put it in the markets, and we'll find out in five or ten years‖ (Greenberg 2010) .
The coupling of monsters with GMO foods reflects the culturally constructed fissure between science and nature, popularized in literature (Frankenstein), comic books (Wolverine), television programs (The Incredible Hulk), movies (Godzilla), and electronic games (Marvel: Ultimate Alliance). In turn, researchers have examined contemporary discourse of scientific controversies and then documented linkages with cultural myths, including the Devil's Bargain in nuclear power (Gamson & Modigliani 1989) , mad scientists exploiting human organs in the cloning debate (Hellsten 2000) , and science-run-amok in stem cell discourse (Reis 2008) . The direct effect of Frankenfood metaphors on cognition has received scant attention, but we might surmise linkages by examining public opinion polls, policy decisions and other markers of the debate. For example, Americans are reported to be somewhat ambivalent in their views of biotechnology, according to a study of attitudes and knowledge among a sample of adults (Silk, Weiner & Parrott 2005) . The researchers suggested this may be due, in part, to a lack of understanding of the benefits of GMO foods. In addition, a Gallup poll reported that about one-third of Americans in 2003 believed GMO foods to be hazardous (Blizzard 2003) . But when it comes to safety, Americans are divided. An ABC News poll asked Americans in 2003 whether foods are safe to eat when -scientists can change the genes in some food crops and farm animals to make them grow faster or bigger and be more resistant to bugs, weeds and disease.‖ Respondents were divided with 46 percent calling such foods safe and 46 percent considering them unsafe (-Biotechnology,‖ n.d.). When prompted, most Americans favor labeling foods when they contain genetically modified products: an ABC news poll in 2001 reported that 93 percent of the random sample of adults said the federal government should require such labels on food, while 57 percent said they would be less likely to buy goods labeled as genetically modified (-Poll: Skepticism of Genetically Modified Foods,‖ n.d.).
We suggest that the combination of fear and ambivalence on the part of publics may reflect discourse of GMO foods in which the frame Frankenfood has served as an under-the-radar metaphor, thus allowing publics to equate genetically engineered foods with Dr. Frankenstein and his monster. Moreover, a playful phrase such as Frankenfood and related puns and word-play may have the added effect of diverting critical attention by activating a complex narrative schema that is wholly irrelevant to the context of a serious discussion of food production policies, which may explain, in part, Americans' ambivalence toward GMO foods.
Designer Babies. News discourse about designer babies primarily illuminates issues surrounding human fertilization but a portion of the narratives equates designer babies with high-priced clothing, strollers and other stylish accoutrements. Readers and viewers learn that parents can now outfit their toddlers with togs from Juicy Couture, Armani, and Dolce and Gabbana. The -Franken-‖ trope appears to be a metaphor for dangerous and monstrous creations, but -designer-‖ has become a widely-used metonym/metaphor for frivolous luxury products in which design is driven more by fashion than by function.
Discourse about designer babies has grown in tandem with scientific advances in fertilization outside the womb (in vitro), drawing praise and criticism. Although the first so-called test tube baby was born in England in 1978, in vitro fertilization (IVF) was relatively uncommon during the 20 th Century. The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention began tracking in vitro births in 1996, recording 35,000 births at that time. Over the next ten years, IVF births rose to 56,000, and Over the last decade, news coverage has been punctuated by several events, (along with strides in genetics, cloning and fecundity) that have captured a range of mediated attention, from reality TV programs to Pulitzer Prize-winning dailies. Legislation over stem cell research, construction of new clinics that offer IVF, and the Vatican's stance on embryo manipulation have garnered attention. Some coverage entwines Hollywood with designer baby discourse, linking fashion with fertility: movie stars outfit their toddlers in designer attire and opt for IVF treatments for themselves or their paid surrogates. As one critic put it, -With designer baby clothes, designer baby toys, it seemed only a matter of time until some fertility clinic began offering designer babies to go with them‖ (Bauer, 6 March 2009). Such discourse invoked metaphoric language about designer babies, doctors playing God, parents shopping for genes, and baby supermarkets.
One watershed moment was the birth of eight children to a woman, Nadya Suleman, living in Southern California in 2009, which launched a new term, Octomom, and engendered discussion over the ethics and policies regarding in vitro fertilization. The word Octomom produced more than 3.6 million hits on Google at the time of this writing, a testament to the salience of the story. Ethical arguments were overshadowed, however, by the landslide of television coverage about Suleman herself, who gave numerous interviews to such notables as Barbara Walters.
While some of the discourse over designer babies assumes a vapid, celebrityhungry tone, ethical issues come to the fore with clinics advertising genetic screening for parents. During the last several years, clinics in the United States have begun to offer genetic screenings to women seeking IVF treatments. When a Los Angeles-based clinic announced on its website that it was offering gender selection as part of its pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) package, the director responded to critics that he was not playing God, but rather, -helping nature‖ and -serving the marketplace‖ (Johnson, 15 June 2006) .
Critics invoked the metaphor of playing God throughout discourse, with some critics associating designer babies with Nazi Germany. The New York Post ran a headline about -Uber Babies‖ noting that detractors likened the practice of selecting an embryo for the baby's gender to Nazi Germany because unwanted embryos may be frozen, sold or tossed away (Edelman, 4 October 2009) . Selection of embryos -goes down a horrible path‖ that one lawyer likened to the Holocaust. In contrast to references to Hitler and Brave New World, metaphors associated designer babies with commodities: something produced, procured and purchased. Clinics were called -banks‖ where parents -place an order‖ and -shop‖ for an Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 7.1 (2011): 29-59 DOI: 10.2478/v10016-011-0003-8 embryo. One colorful example described a clinic as treating -children as commodities‖ that can be -picked off the shelf‖ (-Babies by design,‖ 13 January 2007). Another writer said selecting an embryo is as easy as -choosing a Gucci purse‖ (-Designer babies a disturbing trend,‖ 9 October 2006). Coverage also invoked metaphors of -spare parts,‖ not unlike a search for mechanical pieces to outfit an old automobile, such as an antique headlamp. Discourse over spare parts appeared particularly in discourse about -savior siblings.‖ In some instances, a couple selects a healthy embryo through PGD in order to assist an ill sibling. Stem cells are harvested from the newborn's placenta to save the life of a brother or sister. A popular novel and subsequent Hollywood film called My Sister's Keeper added another dimension when the fictional savior sibling, who had already donated blood marrow, is slated to relinquish a kidney and asks the courts to intervene on her behalf.
Few regulations prevent parents from creating such embryos in the United States, and the discourse is infused with the tropes already noted: God, creator, nature, Hitler, commodification, etc. Discourse surrounding laws and ethics take on what Lakoff and Johnson (1980) While discourse entertains notions of ethics and morality, and critics warn of science-run-amok, readers and viewers also see designer babies as a blessing and hear from both doctors and patients that embryo selection marks a perfectly valid choice. While designer baby undoubtedly embraces elasticity, we argue that the phrase also delimits interpretations by focusing attention less on designer (in lower case) and more on BABY (in upper case). The term designer baby likely invokes entailments of well-dressed toddlers created by scientists, but the term seems to steer clear of the horror of the Frankenstein imagery. We argue that designer baby assumes the resonance of an under-the-radar metaphor in the sense that it limits a range of interpretations. Clearly the term refers to clothing created by fashion moguls, and it is also likely that its meanings get melded with special babies created through advanced fertilization techniques. For example, the in vitro twins of movie stars Matthew Broderick and Sarah Jessica Parker are designer babies in both senses of the term: they were engineered in a petri dish and Parker is the darling of the fashion world, a flesh-and-blood billboard for Jimmy Choo and Christian Dior.
How such discourse impacts public opinion is difficult to track, since designer baby discourse straddles multiple meaning systems, ranging from church doctrine to movie matinées. However, publics have been asked to weigh in about their feelings of stem cell research and genetic engineering. Americans approve of scientific studies of stem cells but not cloning. The Gallup organization found that Americans favor government funding for research involving stem cells used from embryos, and that such research is -morally acceptable.‖ For example, in 2009, about 62 percent agreed that stem cell research was acceptable (Saad, 20 May 2009) .
In contrast, most Americans find human cloning morally undesirable: nine out of ten adults considered cloning -wrong,‖ according to a 2009 Gallup poll, where 88 percent said human cloning is -morally wrong‖ (Saad, 20 May 2009) .
When researchers asked potential parents about genetic testing, most adults were interested in testing for health and disease rather than intelligence and height. The New York University Human Genetics Program gave a questionnaire to 2,246 individuals who sought their services in 2006 and 2007. About 44 percent responded to the survey and said that, given the opportunity, they would screen for mental retardation (75 percent), deafness (54 percent), blindness (56 percent), heart disease (52 percent), and cancer (51 percent). Fewer said they would favor tests for athletic ability (10 percent), superior intelligence (12.6 percent), height (10.4 percent) and longevity (9.2 percent) (Smith, 28 January 2009) .
Few women and men said they would choose the baby's gender, according to a study of 1,197 North American respondents. Eight percent said they would use sex selection technology, 74 percent were opposed, and 18 percent were undecided (Dahl, Gupta, Beutel, Stroebel-Richter, Brosig, Tinneberg & Jain 2006) . But, looking at data supplied by US fertility clinics, about 42 percent of clinics responding to questions about PGD services provide non-medical sex selection to parents (Baruch, Kaufman & Hudson 2008) .
In summary, Americans seem resigned to the idea of designer babies but much less sanguine about human cloning. While the linkage between discourse and opinion is difficult to demonstrate, the term designer baby embraces both fashion Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 7.1 (2011): 29-59 DOI: 10.2478/v10016-011-0003-8
and science in outfitting offspring, and has become commonplace in the vernacular surrounding fertilization techniques. We propose that the entailments of designer baby are more gentle than brutal, much in the same way that puppy love endears listeners. And while Frankenfood may invoke entailments of mad scientists and monsters, we argue that designer baby slips under the cognitive radar by summoning the benign: swaddled infants adored by their parents (and perhaps sporting Gucci birthmarks). Vegetative state. Another example of an under-the-radar metaphor occurs when politicians, political commentators and moralists use -vegetative state‖ to discuss the status of people who have severe cognitive impairment. Vegetative state and the closely-related metaphor "brain-dead" work together in particularly salient ways. While -vegetative‖ in this sense refers to -an organic body capable of growth and development but devoid of sensation and thought‖ (Groopman 2007) , vegetable is a biological category that cannot be accurately applied to a human being or any other animal (vegetables lack central nervous systems) and therefore is unavoidably metaphorical, as most people who use or encounter this metaphor are likely to recognize. When the phrase -vegetative state‖ is used, as in the legal battles surrounding Theresa Schiavo, the implications of vegetable as a life-form lacking a central nervous system or any ordinary animate responses are applied to the patient as if they were literal descriptors, and vegetative state becomes an under-the-radar metaphor.
A revealing exemplar emerged in the Schiavo case. Terri's husband, Michael, sought to have life support withdrawn in 1998 (Kollas & Boyer-Kollas 2006) . Terri, who had been diagnosed in a -persistent vegetative state‖ (PVS) after suffering oxygen loss from cardiac arrest in 1990, became the centerpiece for -unprecedented involvement of the state and federal legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government‖ (p. 1146). The issue captured tremendous media attention and brought issues surrounding life, death, morality and politics to the populist front, and has been called -the most extensively litigated [case] in American judicial history‖ (p. 1146). Thousands of news and magazine articles, broadcast stories and editorials were generated surrounding the legal battles that culminated in a federal district judge's decision to uphold Michael Schiavo's request to remove the feeding tube.
3 Philosopher Slavoj Žižek readily equated the case with biopolitics, noting that discourse -focused on a single case of prolonging the run of NAKED LIFE, of a persistent vegetative state reduced of all specifically human characteristics‖ while -tens of millions [are] dying of AIDS and hunger all around the world‖ (2005). The term vegetable, as a metaphor for symptoms of a permanent coma, crept into popular news discourse. The following example, taken from the MSNBC program -Hardball,‖ illustrates how the host equated vegetative state with vegetable. Chris Matthews noted: -I want to get some facts here. I want to end this discussion on a point. There's a great discrepancy in the assessment as to this woman's vitality. Some people say she's a vegetable. Some say she's capable of emotional responses. Vegetables don't have emotional responses. I'm still trying to get to that fact‖ (Hardball 2005) . In another example, a National Public Radio reporter asked a neurologist to define vegetative state and said, -Do you regret at all the word vegetative? The idea of wakefulness and motion just seems to be in conflict with being a vegetable. It perhaps might be a misleading misnomer.‖ The neurologist called vegetative state an -unfortunate term‖ that is derogatory because -it sounds like vegetable‖ (Siegel, 22 March 2005) .
Although the two terms are often stitched together, it is difficult to trace a direct relationship between public discourse about the Schiavo case and whether American publics equate -vegetable‖ with vegetative state. Numerous polls were conducted during the years of the Schiavo legal skirmishes, and pollsters found that Americans favor ending life support when a partner is in a vegetative state. For example, a CNN-USA Today-Gallup Poll in 2003 reported that 80 percent of Americans endorsed the right to die for a terminally ill patient. The question was worded as follows: -When a patient is in a persistent vegetative state caused by irreversible brain damage, do you think his or her spouse should or should not be allowed by law to make a final decision to end the patient's life by some painless means?‖ (Newport, 30 October 2003) .
Other polls incorporated the word -vegetable‖ in question wording. About 73 percent of Americans polled in 2005 said they worried a great deal or somewhat about the -possibility of being vegetable-like‖ (Saad, 2005 March 29) . In a study of four different 2005 polls, -Hotline,‖ a publication of the National Journal Group (a nonpartisan organization that reports on policy), noted that Americans were more likely to favor the right to die (between 74 and 87 percent agreed) if the question wording included removal of -life support‖ (rather than -feeding tube‖) (-Schiavo surveys,‖ 29 March 2005) .
Pundits also presented the metaphors in visual space. For example, Daryl Cagle drew a cartoon for MSNBC that mocked Senator Bill Frist, who argued that Terri Schiavo did not appear to be in a vegetative state. The cartoon depicts Frist facing an audience, his arms extended, asking -What do I know about vegetables?‖ Frist is surrounded by flying radishes, melons and bananas, some smashed against a wall behind him. The caption underneath the cartoon repeats Frist's public statement: -That footage, to me, depicted something different than persistent vegetative state‖ (Cagle, 21 June 2005) . Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 7.1 (2011): 29-59 DOI: 10.2478/v10016-011-0003-8
In our view, vegetative and vegetable are easily conflated, judging from discourse and opinion polls. The term vegetative state might serve as an under-theradar metaphor in generating thoughts and feelings associated with -human-asvegetable.‖ Vegetative state may very well activate schemas and associated simulations of thoughts, emotions and other perceptions that contradict being human: vegetables lack brains, feelings and emotions. In that respect, we argue that vegetative state delimits rich entailments. It is not surprising, therefore, that when asked their feelings about being in a -vegetable-like state‖ three-quarters of those polled prefer death.
Death tax. Our final exemplar brings to bear what Negri called -the extension of the economic and political contradiction over the entire social fabric‖ wrapped within the biopolitical debate over the so-called death tax (2008: 18) . Death tax was coined to replace the terms estate and inheritance tax, which are paid after the death of a benefactor by the heirs where the inheritance of estates is larger than one million US dollars, affecting only the richest two percent of the American population (Birney, Graetz & Shapiro 2006) . As such, death tax becomes a dysphemism for estate tax favored by conservative politicians and commentators.
Cartoonist Nick Anderson of The Houston Chronicle extended the discourse visually by linking death tax with burgeoning debt. Anderson's cartoon shows two images side-by-side. The first, labeled -The Death Tax,‖ depicts a princess atop a stack of mattresses with a pea sandwiched between the bedding. An arrow points to the pea as the visual representation of death tax: a small item that causes her great discomfort. The caption reads: -Children of the Rich.‖ The second image shows a diapered infant shouldering a blubbery animal with the word -deficit‖ on the beast's flesh. Here the caption reads -The Birth Tax‖ (Anderson, 15 April 2005) .
The cartoon infuses discourse with a touch of humor, and some of the pundits have taken a similar approach, noting that the death tax simply favors -trust babies‖ and should be known as the -Paris Hilton Relief Program‖ (-In the mail,‖ 25 July 2006). More than one critic used the metaphor of a -silver spoon‖ to describe beneficiaries of the death tax, and several offered posthumous congratulations to New York Yankees owner George Steinbrenner, who died in 2010: the year in which the tax was suspended (the estate tax resumed in 2011). Trenchant metaphors referred to Steinbrenner as a -world champion‖ because he -beat‖ the Internal Revenue Service and his heirs -hit the jackpot,‖ (Marr, 17 July 2010: 4c) . Slate Magazine ran an irreverent take on the death tax, declaring that taxes actually increase life expectancy: countries with the highest taxes have the highest life expectancies, such as the United States (Steinbrenner died at age 80) while countries with low taxes, such as India, have a lower life expectancy (Plotz, 19 July 1999) .
Despite the satiric asides, discourse on the estate tax rarely detracted from references to death. In the sense that death is part of a larger complex narrative with myriad entailments, when linked with tax the term invokes probate, inheritance, and, if the estate is quite large, payment of inheritance taxes: the phrase can then be considered metonymic. The word death activates a set of particularly gloomy perceptions and emotions, while tax is truly hated by Americans (Birney et al.) . Thus, the combined phrase, death tax pairs these perceptions and emotions, and can be considered metaphorical. However, the phrase is often presented in political discourse as a literal description, implying that the misfortune of dying is compounded by having to pay a tax rather than being allowed simply to -rest in peace.‖ When polled, Americans incorrectly believe that -death tax‖ means you are taxed when you die (Birney et al.) .
We argue the phrase creeps under the cognitive radar. Context-Limited Simulation Theory suggests that primary portions of the phrase are activatedmost likely feelings associated with -death‖-thus preparing the reader for an emotional reaction that will color additional thoughts of death tax by associating the tax not with the joyous occasion of abruptly acquiring a large amount of unearned money but rather with the sad occasion of dying.
Conservative political advisor Frank Luntz claimed that reframing -estate tax‖ to -death tax‖ better serves the public, and explained his case in terms of rhetorical framing:
Look, for years, political people and lawyers─who, by the way, are the worst communicators─used the phrase -estate tax.‖ And for years they couldn't eliminate it. The public wouldn't support it because the word -estate‖ sounds wealthy. Someone like me comes around and realizes that it's not an estate tax, it's a death tax, because you're taxed at death. And suddenly something that isn't viable achieves the support of 75 percent of the American people. It's the same tax, but nobody really knows what an estate is. But they certainly know what it means to be taxed when you die. I argue that is a clarification; that's not obfuscation (Frontline 2004) .
To justify the metaphorical re-framing, Luntz added: -I don't argue with you that words can sometimes be used to confuse, but it's up to the practitioners of the study of language to apply them for good and not for evil. It is just like fire; fire can heat your house or burn it down.‖ This view assumes a moral stance of -good‖ and -evil‖ on the part of the language framers, while our view is that the language framing packs meaning that invokes predictable responses on the part of reading and listening publics. From the perspective of biopolitics, Luntz has laid claim to the -truth‖ (-It's not an estate tax, it's a death tax‖) which Foucault would argue is created by the shifting of the substrates of meaning produced in the processes of discourse. -Death tax‖ has overshadowed estate tax and inheritance tax, claiming its -rightful‖ place as a truism. Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 7.1 (2011): 29-59 DOI: 10.2478/v10016-011-0003-8
As Luntz pointed out, people associate estate with great wealth (an association that seems accurate, given the rather high threshold for applying the tax) but death is something everyone faces. Thus, by implying that it applies to everyone, and not merely the wealthiest two percent, simply reframing it as a death tax swung public opinion radically against the inheritance tax. In a review of public opinion polls on the estate tax from 1997 to 2003, Birney, Graetz and Shapiro (2006) noted that all polls that asked respondents about taxes engendered negative valence, and that the word -taxes‖ summons poignant and negative feelings. The combination of -death‖ with -tax‖ invokes additional thoughts of fairness and justice, and, according to Birney and colleagues, -many people seem to guess that nearly everyone is taxed at death─a misperception‖ (n.p.).
Death tax also invokes a narrative: the commonplace but terrifying narrative of dying and the related narratives of a -troubled‖ death, which are negatively indexed by the common wish, -Rest in Peace.‖ The narrative of a death that is hindered and troubled by the taxman is counterposed by Luntz's justification against the competing narrative of sudden and unearned wealth that is activated by the alternative phrase, estate tax. As with Frankenfood, these competing metaphors, and the narratives they invoke, are likely to have powerful effects on what people believe (and believe they know) about inheritance taxes.
As an under-the-radar metaphor, Death Tax invoked a narrative that may interact in complicated ways with the actual events to which the metaphors are applied and almost certainly influence what is remembered about news accounts of these events and the surrounding debates. But we also find the phrase is much more limiting than estate tax, particularly in light that the word estate or inheritance is substituted by death. The deft metaphor blunts discourse and, in turn, entailments, in part because the metaphor is literal.
Cognitive framing theory and under-the-radar metaphors
Much of the apparent ambiguity in framing theory stems from the use of the same term within different disciplines to describe overlapping but distinct phenomena (D'Angelo 2002; Entman 1993) . Thus, we distinguish message-level frames from cognitive-level frames or schemas. Price, Tewksbury and Powers (1997) showed that message-level frames can prime particular cognitive schemas, with a consequent effect on how readers process the message: what thoughts they have and their subsequent self-reported attitudes and beliefs about the topic. A message frame can also influence subsequent discourse on the same topic by influencing how individual readers process and respond to a message and thus alter readers' perceptions of what themes are relevant in future messages. We argue that the context of news discourse limits cognitive interpretations in the sense that 50 Cynthia-Lou Coleman & L. David Ritchie Examining Metaphors in Biopolitical Discourse readers and viewers receive and process information within the parameters of journalistic frameworks. That is, the presentation of news-whether seen in print or broadcast channels-contextualizes information in a narrow field, as breaking news, human interest features, opinion-editorials, etc. Such contexts frame messages in ways that carry over to cognitive processing. Thus, we argue, metaphors can have powerful framing effects by activating frame-relevant schemas (Coleman, Ritchie & Hartley 2008; Schön 1993) . Moreover, such metaphors play out in entertainment media, including books, movies, soap operas, cartoons and the Internet.
When an under-the-radar metaphor is presented as literal, the framing effects are likely to be even more powerful, because they present the connections they assert as factual, and create a constructed -reality‖ that future messages must either fit within or overcome by establishing a different reality. Thus, once the death tax frame is accepted as a literal description of the process of taxing large inheritances, critical messages that are deployed must either accept the frame and argue that taxing an extremely rich person upon death is reasonable, or dispute the frame itself by establishing the point that it is, in fact, the heirs (who did not earn the money) and not the deceased (who presumably did but may have inherited much of it in the first place) who are taxed. (It seems likely that this may be rendered even more difficult by the seeming triviality of the distinction.) Once the vegetative state frame is accepted, the very concept of vegetative is changed, just as the concept of designer is changed by designer baby, so that future messages must struggle not merely to change the frame itself, but re-establish a more complex and accurate understanding of the base concepts, vegetative and designer. In order for GMO foods to be embraced as real measures to curb world hunger, audiences must grapple with the spectre of Frankenstein's monster.
The exemplars used here illustrate an important point about under-the-radar metaphors used in biopolitical discourse: They can have a powerful ideological effect that compounds their cognitive impact. Because the figurative expressions are taken as literal, the connections they establish between certain perceptual simulators and the presumed conditions that produce the perceptions are taken as real and true, hence beyond reasonable dispute. Thus, an expression of this type can have the effect of -naturalizing‖ the frame it establishes, rendering it as apparently factual and descriptive, hence not subject to critical examination and dispute.
Implications for framing theory and persuasion
The contribution of metaphorical languages to message framing has long been recognized and discussed. What the concept of under-the-radar metaphors adds to this discussion is the recognition that certain metaphors, if presented in a way that seems literal rather than figurative, can have an even more powerful framing effect, establishing the implicit frame as an aspect of reality that is beyond challenge. As the discourse surrounding death tax illustrates, a trope of this sort can present an opponent with the unpalatable choice between accepting the frame (with its underlying narrative) and attempting to construct a contrary argument within it, or taking on the difficult task of challenging the frame itself─that is to say, challenging the already-accepted -reality.‖ Equally important, Frankenfood changes our understanding of genetic engineering, while vegetative state alters our perceptions of life and death, so that the rhetorical and ideological effects of these unchallenged, under-the-radar metaphors extend well beyond the narrow topics of GMO foods and irreversible comas.
How audiences actually process and respond to metaphors such as the ones discussed in this essay require more research. That Americans have heard about death taxes or Frankenfood is documented by pollsters, but it is for future research to establish what happens once an under-the-radar metaphor takes hold, and if readers' critical responses are held in check by a metaphor that comes disguised as a statement of literal fact.
Implications for metaphor theory
Along with the idiosyncratic and uninterpretable metaphors discussed by Keysar and Bly (1999) and the -empty‖ metaphors discussed by Ritchie and Dyhouse (2008) , the phenomenon of under-the-radar metaphors and their widespread use in biopolitical discourse raise serious questions about the customary practice of seeking a singular interpretation of a metaphorical phrase, even if it does seem to fit within a systematic or conceptual metaphor (Cameron 2003; Lakoff & Johnson 1980) . Rather, as Gibbs (2006) argues, it is necessary to examine the perceptual simulations activated by a figurative expression, in the particular context in which it is used.
The suggestion that these under-the-radar expressions have an ideological as well as a cognitive and rhetorical effect leads to the further implication that metaphor theorists might usefully examine metaphors, in particular uninterpretable metaphors and -naturalized‖ metaphors that are presented as literal, for their possible ideological effects. Metaphor theorists might further look for systematicity, not just among the vehicles used to form metaphorical expressions, but also among the contextual effects─the perceptual simulations they activate when used in particular contexts. This approach likely will pay dividends in understanding the role of metaphors in mediating between individual, cognitive -Under-the-radar‖ is itself not a clearly defined category; many metaphors may fit our description. Some of the metaphors we have discussed are certain to be disputed. Opponents of taxation may claim that the relevant feature of the tax is its association with death, whereas proponents claim that the relevant feature is its association with inheriting a large fortune. Other metaphors we have discussed, including such emotionally-charged examples as Frankenfood, are unambiguously metaphorical, but may still be claimed to be in some important sense -literally true.‖ Advocates for opposing positions on the underlying moral and political controversies are likely to take opposing positions on the metaphorical status of these phrases, a fact that is entirely consistent with the approach we have suggested.
Conclusion
We have identified a class of expressions presented in a way that can be taken easily as literal (and in many cases are regarded as literal by the people who use these expressions) even though, upon closer examination, it becomes apparent that they can also be taken as metaphorical. In some cases (Tony Blair's use of "I'm back") a phrase is used in a way that is simultaneously literal and metaphorical (Ritchie 2008) . We have suggested that the ambiguous status of these phrases enables them to bring implicit assumptions under our radar of ordinary critical scrutiny, and that this can greatly strengthen their framing effects.
Along with the phenomenon of -empty‖ and -ambiguous‖ metaphors (Ritchie & Dyhouse 2008) , the phenomenon of under-the-radar metaphors supports the claim that metaphors do not necessarily have a single interpretation based on a single underlying systematic or conceptual metaphor (Vervaeke & Kennedy, 1996) and that the meaning of a metaphor is often best represented by the schemas and perceptual simulations it activates in a particular communicative context (Gibbs 2006; Ritchie 2009 ).
Thus, metaphor analysts and theorists need to consider not merely the linguistic context (the preceding words and phrases) but also the social, cultural and relational contexts, and examine the perceptual simulators that the phrase is likely to activate for particular users, as well as for hearers, readers and viewers, in a particular context. Additionally, metaphors should be classified not merely according to semantic relationships among their vehicles, but also according to the fields of meaning constituted by relationships among the context-relevant schemas and perceptual simulations they activate.
